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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

LACEY ANN JOHNSON,

Case No. 20140310-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant is not incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION
As the State correctly concedes Lacey Johnson was erroneously convicted of one
count of uttering a threat of violence, and both in-concert enhancements to the counts of
threat of violence and retaliation. SB.11-12. As those erroneous convictions lack any
legal basis whatsoever they must be reversed and dismissed with prejudice.
The only remaining issue is whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence
from which to conclude, from a reasonable inference and beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Lacey "direct[ed a] threat or action" at Jay, exclusively "as retaliation or retribution."
Utah Code§ 76-8-508.3(2)(b)(ii). There is no question that the answer is no.
The State agrees this jury could make a "reasonable inference that the attack was
because Jay had provoked" Lacey; and it acknowledges that its theory of guilt is "not
necessarily mutually exclusive" to Lacey's theory of innocence, as Lacey "could very
well have assaulted Jay as pay back for his calling the cops and for the things he said to
her that night." SB.18,19. Yet, while the State claims the jury could simply choose which
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reasonable alternative to believe (SB.18), decades of Utah cases belie that claim. Indeed,
our courts reverse in this situation, where the State's evidence "did not preclude the
reasonable alternative hypothesis presented by the defense," as '"reasonable minds must
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt."' State v. Buck, 2009
UT App 2, ,rl4, 200 P.3d 674 (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986)).
Thus, and for the reasons set forth in this brief, the opening brief, and the state's brief,
Lacey's conviction for retaliation should be summarily reversed and vacated.

I.

THE STATE CORRECTLY CONCEDES THAT LACEY'S
THREE CONVICTIONS FOR ONE COUNT OF THREAT OF
VIOLENCE AND TWO IN-CONCERT ENHANCEMENTS,
MUST ALL BE REVERSED AND VACATED WITH
PREJUDICE.

The State correctly concedes Lacey was erroneously convicted of three
charges. It was error to enter a conviction and sentence in this case for the count of
uttering a threat of violence, which was enhanced to a class-A-misdemeanor
through the in-concert enhancement, where neither of those offenses were ever
submitted to a jury. See OB.14-23;SB.10-12. The State does not dispute that
double jeopardy prevents Lacey's retrial on those charges (OB.23-24), thus this
Court should remand with an order that the enhanced conviction and sentence be
reversed and vacated with prejudice.
Similarly, the State correctly concedes the error in entering the conviction
and enhanced sentence for in-concert retaliation, where the enhancement does not
statutorily apply to the offense of retaliation. See OB.24-30; SB.12. This Court
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should therefore remand with an order to reverse and vacate the enhanced
conviction for retaliation as well.

II.

LACEY'S CONVICTION FOR RETALIATION MUST ALSO
BE VACATED WHERE AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES,
WITH JAY'S INDEPENDENT THREATS AND ACTIONS,
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO EXCLUDE THE
REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT LACEY DID NOT
DIRECT A THREAT OR ACTION SOLELY AS
RETALIATION.

The State acknowledges the circumstantial evidence in this case made it
reasonable to infer that Lacey kicked Jay high in the back of his thigh under his buttocks,
in response to his violent threats and insults that he hurled at Lacey. SB.17-19. Where the
State concedes that its evidence did not preclude this reasonable hypothesis of innocence,
this Court must reverse her conviction for retaliation. See OB.31-36; see also SB.19
(citing Buck, 2009 UT App 2, ,r13); see also State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 411-12 (Utah
1978) ("the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the
defendant's guilt").
A retaliation conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant "direct[] the threat or action ... as retaliation or retribution against the witness,
victim, or informant." Utah Code§§ 76-8-508.3(2)(b),(i),(ii); see OB.31-43. The State
relied on circumstantial evidence for Lacey's mens rea for retaliation charge; but where
that circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable inference that Lacey acted in
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response to Jay's independent provocation and not solely as retaliation, it was error to
send the State's retaliation charge to the jury. 1
Indeed, the evidence in this case made it reasonable, if not significantly more
likely that Lacey reacted to Jay's intervening and vicious provocation, rather than acting
with the exclusive mens rea for retaliation. OB.38-39;OB.34-35 (Jay told Lacey, "if she
tried using a [T]aser on" him, that he would "shove it down her throat," Jay also told
Lacey "[w]hy don't you get high and pass out on another one of your babies, bitch,"
knowing it would "affect her");OB.42-43 ("The only reasonable inference from this
evidence is that her acts were defensive and not retaliatory");OB.42-43 ("To say that in
this case, Lacey acted with the conscious objective to retaliate against Jay for his role in
an official proceeding, and not merely in defense of Jay's harassment, "require[s]
speculative leaps over yawning gaps in the evidence.").
The State suggests the jury could simply accept "the reasonable inference" that
Lacey "was mad at Jay and his wife for calling police on her and her dog, and that she
then assaulted Jay as payback." SB.17; see also SB.18-19 (claiming nonetheless that "the
existence of competing reasonable inferences still requires that the trial court submit the
case to the jury." SB.18-19 (citing Buck, 2009 UT App 2, iJ13); SB.19 (claiming no
"settled Utah law" requires "that the State had to prove retaliation was her sole
motivation"). The State's claim contravenes settled Utah law, where it also acknowledges

1

The State relied on circumstantial evidence to infer this element. See OB.32-36
(marshaling the circumstantial evidence); 36-43 (arguing the inferences drawn therefrom
are insufficient to prove specific intent to retaliate); see also SB.17-20 (discussing the
reasonableness of inferences to prove this element).
4
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"the jury could also draw a reasonable inference that the attack was because Jay had
provoked her with the death of her child." SB.18 (emphasis added); see also SB.19
(claiming "the two inferences ... are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Defendant
could very well have assaulted Jay as pay back for his calling the cops and for the things
he said to her that night.").
However, our cases instruct that where "the evidence and inferences did not

preclude the reasonable alternative hypothesis presented by the defense" that "evidence
is so insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt."' Buck, 2009 UT App 2, if 14 (quotation
omitted) (emphasis added). This is true because, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if
it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
guilt." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ifl 8, 63 P.3d 94 (alteration original); see also
OB.32-42 (Court cannot make "speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence.").
That our Courts reverse in this situation was recently reaffirmed in State v.

Gallegos. 2015 UT App 78. There the Court reversed the denial of a motion for a directed
verdict where the evidence was similarly insufficient to prove the defendant's mens rea
beyond mere speculation. The City argued in that case, that there was "sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable inference" of the defendant's guilt. Id.,IIO. This Court
agreed, but noted this was not the end of the inquiry on appeal, where the City's claim
was based on "no more than speculation." Id. The Court reaffirmed, '" [w]hen the
evidence supports more than one possible conclusion, none more likely than the other,
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the choice of one possibility over another can be no more than speculation.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, iJ16, 238 P.3d 1096).
Gallegos is only the most recent in a panoply of cases requiring that where a case
is "dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence" those "circumstances must be such as
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt of the offense
charged that every circumstance constituting a necessary link in the chain of evidence
must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence." State
v. Crawford, 201 P. 1030, 1033 (Utah 1921); see also State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285,302
(1941) ("where the proof of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon circumstantial
evidence, such circumstances must be such as to reasonably exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than the existence of such fact and be consistent with its existence and
inconsistent with its non-existence."); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976)
("When the only proof of presumed facts consists of circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances must reasonably preclude every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's
innocence."). 2

2

State v. Thompson does not help the State. See SB.20 (citing 2005 UT App 502 (mem)).
The State argues it stands for the proposition that evidence was sufficient even "where
the evidence showed Thompson could have multiple reasons for retaliating against the
victim." SB.20. That was not the holding in Thompson, where the defense was that no
evidence showed his guilt, not that there was also a reasonable hypothesis of Thompson's
innocence. See 2005 UT App 502 ("Thompson argues that there was no evidence that he
intentionally or knowingly struck the victim in retaliation for her role in the pending
cases," thus the jury simply made that reasonable inference of guilt). Moreover,
Thompson involved a charge of tampering with a witness, which does not require the
element of retaliation that Lacey challenges here, that of proof the actor direct a threat or
action, "as retaliation or retribution." Utah Code§ 76-8-508.3(2)(b)(ii).
6

Indeed, to find Lacey guilty of retaliation here would "require[] not just one level
of inference but two," if not more. Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78, ,IlO (citation omitted).
First, that Lacey ever actually intended to somehow retaliate against Jay specifically. And
then that even though Jay approached her, at her house, at night, where he violently
threatened her, that she did not react to him but was only motivated to the desire to
retaliate. However, "[w ]bile inferences drawn from facts in evidence are appropriate,
inferences drawn from inferences are not." Id. (citations omitted). And where the
evidence failed to "exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt"
it was error to send this case to the jury. John, 586 P.2d at 411-12.
The State's evidence was insufficient to prove its charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. It was therefore plain and obvious error to send the retaliation charge to
the jury. OB.43-44. Alternatively, for the same reasons, defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to object, in any way, to the insufficiency of the evidence of retaliation, which
prejudiced Lacey via an invalid conviction and sentence. OB.44-45. Under either
standard, this Court must vacate Lacey's conviction for retaliation.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this and the Opening Brief, Lacey's enhanced
convictions for threat of violence and retaliation must be vacated, and because the
evidence is insufficient to uphold her retaliation conviction, it too must be vacated.
SUBMITTED this
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day of April, 2014.
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